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Abstrat
We present an in-depth analysis on the strength of
the almost 10,000 passwords from users of an in-
stant messaging server in Italy. We estimate the
strength of those passwords, and ompare the ef-
fetiveness of state-of-the-art attak methods suh
as ditionaries and Markov hain-based tehniques.
We show that the strength of passwords ho-
sen by users varies enormously, and that the ost
of attaks based on password strength grows very
quikly when the attaker wants to obtain a higher
suess perentage. In aordane with existing
studies we observe that, in the absene of mea-
sures for enforing password strength, weak pass-
words are ommon. On the other hand we disover
that there will always be a subset of users with ex-
tremely strong passwords that are very unlikely to
be broken.
The results of our study will help in evaluat-
ing the seurity of password-based authentiation
means, and they provide important insights for in-
spiring new and better proative password hekers
and password reovery tools.
1 Introdution
Even though muh has been said about their weak-
nesses, passwords still are  and will be in the fore-
seeable future  ubiquitous in omputer authenti-
ation systems. A peuliar harateristis of pass-
words is that they inherently arry a trade-o be-
tween usability and seurity: while strong pass-
words are hard for attakers to guess, they are
on the other hand also diult for the user to re-
member. As Rihard Smith paradoxially notes,
password best praties imply that the password
must be impossible to remember and never written
down [17℄. In light of this, it is not very surprising
that users often knowingly hoose to use weak pass-
words or irumvent seurity best praties, sine
they pereive that following them would get in the
way of doing their work [1, 15℄.
To think sensibly about the seurity of systems
that use passwords, it is therefore essential to an-
alyze the harateristis of passwords hosen by
users. In this work, we analyze a large dataset on-
taining all user passwords from an instant messag-
ing server loated in Italy. Unlike previous empiri-
al studies on passwords [10, 7, 18, 11, 3, 4, 9℄, this
paper evaluates the strength of passwords against a
variety of state of the art tehniques for andidate
generation. The analysis we onduted beneted
from having aess to the passwords in unenrypted
form; this made it possible to measure the strength
of all of them, inluding those that would hardly
be raked even by extremely powerful attakers.
We evaluate the strength of a password in terms
of their assoiated searh spae size, that is the
number of attempts that an attaker would need
to orretly guess it. This measure does not de-
pend on the partiular nature of the authentiation
system nor on the attaker apabilities: it is only
related to the attak tehnique and to the way users
hoose their password. The attak model and the
harateristis of the system will instead dene the
ost that the attaker has to pay for eah single
guess. By ombining this ost with our measures
of password strength, it beomes possible to obtain
a sound ost-benet analysis for attaks based on
password guessing on an authentiation system.
As we will show, dierent attak tehniques are
advisable depending on the searh spae size that
the attaker an aord to explore. This has to be
1
taken into aount when proposing and evaluating
new tehniques for reduing the searh spae: they
may be eetive only if the strength of the attak
falls within a given interval.
We show that password strength has an ex-
tremely wide variane: as a rst approximation,
the probability to guess a password at eah attempt
dereases roughly exponentially as the size of the
explored searh spae grows. These diminishing re-
turns imply that, in most ases, an attaker would
eventually nd a point where the ost of ontinuing
the attak would not be justied by the probabil-
ity of suess. This study provides gures that an
help designers and administrators in assessing the
seurity of their systems by evaluating where that
point resides.
2 Related Work
In this setion we provide a short review of studies
about password seurity, and make the ase for the
importane of measuring password strength. At-
taks suh as phishing or soial engineering, where
the user is misled in ommuniating the password
to the attaker, are unrelated to password strength
and therefore outside the sope of this work.
Priing Via Proessing To defend against in-
truders who repeatedly try password after password
until they obtain aess to the system, it is possible
to limit the rate at whih the attaker is allowed to
try new passwords by requiring the user to perform
an ation with a moderate ost. While legitimate
users would need to perform this ation only one
every time they try to log on, an attaker would
need to repeat this proess many times, resulting
in a disproportionate ost that renders the attak
worthless. The following measures belong to this
ategory:
• CAPTCHAs [19℄, whih require solving puz-
zles that are diult without human interven-
tion;
• key strengthening tehniques, whih require a
few seonds of omputation to derive a key
from the passwords; this idea rst appeared
in the design of the UNIX system in the late
'70s [10℄. A modern key strengthening algo-
rithm, where the omputation length is ong-
urable via the hoie of a tunable parameter,
is PBKDF2 [6℄.
It is important to note that these tehniques impose
a trade-o to legitimate users: if an honest user
has to pay a ost c, the attaker must pay at most
c · s, where s is the strength of the password in
terms of the number of attempts needed to guess
it. The measures obtained in this paper an be used
to estimate osts and benets of these systems, and
thus to properly tune this c parameter.
An alternative approah bloks aounts after a
given number of failed attempts. This response,
however, opens the door to denial of servie attaks
on user aounts and is ineetive unless the attak
is speially targeted towards a single user [13℄.
Oine Attaks In most ases, the authentia-
tion server does not store passwords in plain text.
Instead, it keeps an enrypted version of them
whih is oneptually analogous to a hash: when a
user attempts to log on, the password they provide
is enrypted and ompared to the stored value. In
this way, even if an attaker obtains the enrypted
passwords, these annot be used right away to log
on to the system. To make it ostly for the at-
taker to guess the password by enrypting lots of
password andidates, key strengthening tehniques
are again applied. Attaks based on pre-omputing
the enrypted version of the most likely passwords
[11, 12℄ are defeated with the simple tehnique of
salting, also known sine the early days of UNIX:
that tehnique works by appending a random num-
ber to the password before enrypting it, and then
storing this number along with the enrypted pass-
word.
Sine these tehniques are based on the idea
of making guessing attaks ostly, the password
strength that we are measuring is also a key pa-
rameter when evaluating the resiliene of a pass-
word system to oine attaks.
Password Reovery We measure password
strength by taking into aount attempts to break
them with state of the art tehniques. The free
password reovery software John the Ripper
1
iden-
ties passwords by heking them against a large-
sized ditionary, plus a xed set of mangling rules,
1
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suh as appending or prepending digits to ditio-
nary words. Aording to Brue Shneier's de-
sription [16℄, AessData's proprietary Password
Reovery Toolkit omplements this approah with
a phoneti pattern set generated via a Markov
hain routine to generate meaningless but pro-
nouneable passwords. In Setion 5, we formal-
ize a method based on the same idea and evaluate
its merits in reduing the searh spae for raking
passwords.
Proative Password Cheking A proative
password heker is a system that fores (or ad-
vises) the user to hoose omplex enough pass-
words.
The impat of these hekers on atual password
seurity is debatable: as Wu [20℄ notes, [users are℄
very good at seleting passwords that are just `good
enough' to pass whatever heking is in plae. The
MySpae soial network requires users to have at
least a non-alphabeti harater in their password;
in a set of leaked passwords, 86% of the users om-
plied with this requirement by appending a num-
ber at the end of their password; for 20% of them
that number was a 1 [14℄. Furthermore, a proa-
tive password heker ould enourage users to use
non-ditionary passwords that are related to their
personal life suh as dates, telephone numbers or li-
ense plate numbers [1℄. For a motivated attaker,
these passwords are even easier to guess than di-
tionary words. Moreover, a strong password in
the abstrat ould fore the user to write it down
and leave it in a plae where an attaker an easily
nd it. For example, many employees hide pass-
words under their mouse pads at their ompanies
[17℄.
In general, it seems that password strength
hekers atually inrease system seurity only if
they are seen by users as a tool that helps them
and not just as an additional hoop they have to
jump through to get their job done.
Existing password hekers are based on quite
naive metris [2, 21℄: they hek on password
length, or resiliene to brute fore and ditio-
nary based attaks; still, they do not take into a-
ount advaned raking tehniques. Our measure
of strength as searh spae size an be used as the
basis for more eetive password hekers.
Empirial Studies It is a well known fat that
many users almost invariably hoose easy to guess
passwords; urrent empirial studies, however, gen-
erally fous on a single kind of attak and neglet
to quantify how strong the remaining share of pass-
words are with respet to more general attaks.
To the best of our knowledge, no other work eval-
uates the strength of passwords over their whole
strength spetrum and against all state-of-the-art
tehniques.
Analyses on ditionary attaks report a perent-
age of broken passwords varying between 17% and
24% [10, 7, 18℄. In Setion 4, before investigat-
ing the remaining stronger passwords, we obtain
results of similar magnitude, varying with the type
and size of ditionary used.
Some studies are based on a dataset of enrypted
passwords, and only report on the ones that have
been atually raked [7, 11, 3, 9℄; in omparison,
we had aess to the plain-text whih gave us in-
formation on the passwords that would be ompu-
tationally impratial to break.
In a 2007 study [4℄, Florenio and Herley ob-
tained data about the passwords of about 500,000
users. That work provides interesting insights
about user habits, but only quanties password
strength with a simple bit strength measure based
on their length and on the use of upperase, nu-
meri, and non-alphanumeri haraters; resiliene
against advaned password-raking tehniques is
not taken into onsideration.
3 Our Dataset
Our dataset ontains the unenrypted passwords
for the 9,317 registered users of an Italian instant
messaging server. Storing passwords in plain text
on the server is required by authentiation algo-
rithms suh as CRAM-MD5
2
. User registration is
free and no poliy for password strength is enfored:
even the empty password is allowed. The absene
of strength enforement allows us to investigate the
behavior of users when hoosing their password in
the absene of external requirements.
Users are free to hoose any unused username
when registering. A total of 269 users (2.89% of
the total) use the same string as both username
and password. The single most eetive attempt
2
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Figure 1: Password length distribution.
to guess a given user's password would therefore be
its own username.
Some users share the same password, and this
results in 7,848 unique passwords. While in some
ases this may be due to oinidenes and use of too
frequent passwords, other ases may be the onse-
quene of the same people registering under dier-
ent usernames at the same server.
The average password length is 7.86. Figure 1
shows the length distribution. Even though the
full Uniode harater set is usable for the pass-
words, only 124 dierent haraters had been used.
Frequenies of haraters have very uneven distri-
butions (see table 1): while one harater out of
11 is an `a', the most frequent upperase harater
(`A') has a frequeny of approximately 1 in 500.
In table 2, we show the mathing ratio of various
simple regular expression. More than 50% of the
passwords ontain only lowerase haraters, and
less than 7% ontain non-alphanumeri haraters.
Around 15% of them onsist of a string of lowerase
haraters followed by a numeri appendage.
We also analyzed a set of 33,671 leaked MySpae
passwords [5, 14℄. Sine these passwords have been
obtained through a phishing attak, they inlude
those of less seurity-onsious users who fell for
the attak. Moreover, MySpae requires users to
insert non-alphabeti haraters in their passwords,
and this imposes an artiial impat on passwords
that users, left alone, would hoose. For these rea-
sons, we onsider this dataset less representative
of atual user passwords than our primary one; we
however use it in this work to orroborate some of
our ndings by validating them on another dataset.
Charater Count Perentage
a 6,681 9.12%
e 4,520 6.17%
o 4,484 6.12%
i 4,388 5.99%
r 3,628 4.95%
n 3,310 4.52%
l 3,095 4.23%
s 2,895 3.95%
t 2,853 3.90%
1 2,518 3.44%
 2,367 3.23%
m 2,137 2.92%
0 1,990 2.72%
p 1,945 2.66%
d 1,813 2.48%
2 1,692 2.31%
u 1,640 2.40%
b 1,624 2.22%
3 1,487 2.03%
g 1,334 1.82%
other 16,832 22.98%
Table 1: Charater distribution.
Expression Example Mathes
[a-z℄+ abdef 51.20%
[A-Z℄+ ABCDEF 0.29%
[A-Za-z℄+ AbCdEf 53.74%
[0-9℄+ 123456 9.10%
[a-zA-Z0-9℄+ A1b2C3 93.43%
[a-z℄+[0-9℄+ ab123 14.51%
[a-zA-Z℄+[0-9℄+ aB123 16.30%
[0-9℄+[a-zA-Z℄+ 123aB 1.80%
[0-9℄+[a-z℄+ 123ab 1.65%
Table 2: Perentage of passwords mathing various
regular expressions.
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4 Ditionary Attak
Ditionary attak is the most eetive tehnique to
guess the weakest passwords. We evaluated pass-
word strength by using the ditionaries available in
the already mentioned John the Ripper (JtR) pass-
word reovery tool. The extended ditionaries that
we used are available for paid download from the
program website
3
.
4.1 The Ditionaries
The JtR ditionaries ontain words from 21 dier-
ent human languages, plus a list of frequently used
passwords. For some languages (like English and
Italian), various ditionaries of dierent sizes are
available: the smaller ones ontain only the most
frequently used words while the bigger ones also
ontain more obsure words, the rationale being
that more ommon words are more likely to be ho-
sen as passwords. Taken together, all ditionaries
aount for almost 4 million words. A bigger ditio-
nary ontaining more than 40 millions words is ob-
tained using mangling rules that attempt to re-
ate more omplex passwords by altering ditionary
words, for example by juxtaposition of ditionary
words or by appending a number at the end of the
word.
An often-advised tehnique to reate strong but
easy to remember passwords is to turn phrases
into passwords by extrating an aronym, possibly
also using puntuation. For example, the phrase
Alas, poor Yorik! I knew him, Horatio beomes
A,pY!Ikh,H. We also evaluated suh aronyms
with a ditionary reated by Kuo et al. [8℄ that was
put together by sraping websites displaying mem-
orable phrases, suh as itations and musi lyris.
4.2 Experimental Results
We simulated ditionary attaks with all the JtR
ditionaries. Table 3 shows the results for the most
representative instanes.
The found olumn lists the perentage of pass-
words that appear in that ditionary; the guess
probability olumn reets the probability that a
random word from that ditionary mathes a ran-
dom password: a rational attaker would try a word
from that ditionary only if the benet of raking
3
http://www.openwall.om/wordlists/
Ditionary Size Found Guess prob.
Frequent passwords 3,114 7.25% 2.33 · 10−5
English 1 l 27,424 4.91% 1.79 · 10−6
English 2 l 296,809 9.42% 3.17 · 10−7
English 3 l 390,532 11.59% 2.97 · 10−7
English extra l 444,678 8.03% 1.81 · 10−7
Italian 1 l 63,041 3.71% 5.89 · 10−7
Italian 2 l 344,074 14.89% 4.33 · 10−7
All above 1,117,767 25.51% 2.28 · 10−7
All JtR ditionaries 3,917,193 25.94% 6.62 · 10−8
All JtR + mangling 40,532,676 30.12% 7.43 · 10−9
Mnemonis [8℄ 406,430 1.27% 3.12 · 10−8
Table 3: Ditionary attaks. The l aronym
stands for all-lowerase ditionaries: those on-
taining upperase letters are mathed by very few
words in our dataset. The English 1, English 2 and
English 3 ditionaries, like Italian 1 and Italian 2,
are listed in growing size; eah word belonging to
a smaller ditionary is also ontained in the bigger
versions.
the password exeeds the inverse of that probability
times the ost of the eort for trying that password.
The English extra ditionary has a slightly mis-
leading name: it ontains words that don't ap-
pear in a regular ditionary but that users are
likely to use, suh as proper nouns, ommon mis-
spellings or alterations of words. Many of them are
language-agnosti (e.g., Aldebaran) or ome from
non-English languages (Mariela).
As the server is in Italy, most users are Italian.
The amount of English words found in passwords
is not partiularly surprising for those who know
the tendeny that natives have towards the heavy
use (and abuse) of English. An interesting feature
is the notieably higher density of ommon English
words (those present in the small English 1 ditio-
nary); that phenomenon is muh less relevant with
respet to Italian. We think that this is aused by
the fat that most users know English as a seond
language, and thus are less inlined to use an ob-
sure word as their password. This suggests that it
might be good pratie to use one's native language
to reate stronger passwords.
The most important lesson drawn from this data
is the priniple of diminishing returns : the proba-
bility of guessing a word sharply dereases as the
ditionary grows. The 3,100-word ditionary of fre-
5
quent passwords raks 7% of those in our datasets;
by inreasing roughly 300 times the size of the di-
tionary up to more than one million and inlud-
ing all Italian and English words, the number of
raked passwords rises to 25%. When the number
of attempts grows beyond 40 millions by inluding
other languages and mangling, only 5% more of the
passwords are found. To put it in another way, the
probability of guessing a given password by trying
an element of the frequent passwords ditionary
is one in 43,000. On the other hand, after hav-
ing tried all the frequent passwords and the Italian
and English ditionary, the probability of guessing
by using another ditionary word is less than one
in 500 million! Sine the guessing probability de-
reases so sharply, it is oneivable that in many
ases it won't be worth trying a bigger ditionary
for the attaker.
We also observe that the mnemoni ditionary
is quite ineetive. This may be due to several
reasons: rst, few users atually use mnemonis
for their passwords; seond, they are atually muh
harder to break with ditionary attaks. Moreover,
we are not able to asertain whether the habit of
hoosing English passwords for Italian users would
arry over to the use of mnemonis. Our data is,
at the moment, insuient to point towards one
reason or the other.
5 Markov Chain-Based Attak
The fat that ditionaries fall short does not mean
that an attaker would need to resort to an exhaus-
tive brute-fore attak: some passwords are muh
more likely to be hosen than others. As seen in
Setion 3, there is a very uneven distribution of
harater hoie. Moreover, other regularities ex-
ist: passwords are usually made of pronouneable
sub-strings and/or sequenes of keys that are lose
on the keyboard.
In this setion, we desribe and validate an at-
tak based on Markov hain-based modeling of the
frequenies of sub-strings with parametri length
k, or k-graphs. This allows us to label andidate
passwords with variable probabilities, where strings
that are labeled as more likely are heked rst.
Some password generating utilities atually use this
kind of modeling to obtain meaningless but pro-
nouneable passwords on the grounds that they're
easier to remember, thus sariing some strength
for usability
4
.
5.1 The Tehnique
We base our formalization on the tehniques shown
in [11℄, extending the model so that it applies to
sub-strings of length 3 and more. This model rep-
resents a password hoie as a sequene of random
events: rst, the length of the password is hosen
aording to a given probability distribution; then,
eah harater of the string gets extrated aord-
ing to a onditional probability depending on the
previous k − 1 haraters.
We enode the harateristis of passwords via
two funtions, λ and ν. λ represents the length dis-
tribution of passwords so that, for example, λ (8)
is the probability that the password has length 8.
ν, instead, represents the onditional probability
of eah k-graph with respet to the orresponding
(k − 1)-graph: ν (c1 . . . ck |c1 . . . ck−1 ) is the prob-
ability that the harater ck follows the sub-string
c1 . . . ck−1. For k = 1, ν (c) expresses the frequeny
of c, that is, the probability that a random hara-
ter in a password oinides with c.
By hoosing k = 1, thus fousing on harater
frequeny, the probability P1 (α) that our model
will generate a string α (where its length is |α| and
its ith harater is αi) is
P1 (α) = λ (|α|)
∏
1≤i≤|α|
ν (αi) .
To derive Pk with k ≥ 2, we will adopt the
onvention that αi = ⊥ whenever i ≤ 0, where
⊥ is a speial harater not allowed to appear
in passwords. For example, we write the probabil-
ity that a password starts with the a harater as
ν (”⊥a” |”⊥”); the probability that a b follows an
initial a is instead ν (”⊥ab” |”⊥a”). Given this,
we an formalize the digraph-based probability P2
as
P2 (α) = λ (|α|)
∏
1≤i≤|α|
ν (αi−1αi |αi−1 )
and, in general,
4
See for example gpw (http://www.multiians.org/
thvv/tvvtools.html#gpw), apg (http://www.adel.nursat.
kz/apg/), otp (http://www.fourmilab.h/onetime/).
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Pk (α) = λ (|α|)
∏
1≤i≤|α|
ν (αi−k+1 . . . αi |αi−k+1 . . . αi−1 ) .
5.1.1 Estimating ν and λ
It is obviously important that the probabilities en-
oded in the λ and ν funtions are representative
of the real harateristis of passwords. We do this
by adopting a set of strings as a training set and
setting λ (x) as the fration of strings of length x.
Denoting C as the harater set and σ (c1 . . . ck) as
the number of ourrenes of the sub-string c1 . . . ck
in the whole training set, we set
ν (c1 . . . ck |c1 . . . ck−1 ) =
σ (c1 . . . ck)∑
c∈C σ (c1 . . . ck−1c)
.
In the absene of a representative training set of
passwords, a ditionary an be used as in [11℄. As
we will experimentally show in Setion 5.2, using
passwords themselves as training set nally results
in a better model. In this ase, when omputing
Pk (α) in our experiments, α itself must be removed
from the training set and should not be taken into
aount when omputing the values of λ and σ.
As mentioned in Setion 3, some users share the
same password. This might be due to hane and
to the fat that those passwords are quite trivial;
another possibility is that they ome from the same
user registering many aounts and using the same
passwords for all of them. In the latter ase, an
attaker would not have aess to the password in
a representative training set, and it would be or-
ret for our purposes to remove all opies of the
password from the training set. Sine we annot
disriminate between the two ases, we will adopt
a onservative approah that may result in overes-
timating the apabilities of the attaker, therefore
disarding only a single opy of the password from
the training set.
A model with higher values of k should be more
aurate, but the proess of reating it is more dif-
ult and expensive. In the extreme, a model with
k exeeding the maximum password length would
expliitly list the probability of ourrene of eah
possible password: this would require prohibitive
training set size and storage apabilities (the re-
quired spae is of the order of |C|k, where |C| is the
size of the harater set). With limited resoures,
Algorithm 1 Expliit ounting of searh spae
size.
funtion size(c1 . . . ck−1, l, t)
⊲ c1 . . . ck−1: state, l: string length, t:
threshold
if l = 0 then return 1
s ← 0
for all c ∈ C do
p ← ν (c1 . . . ck−1c| c1 . . . ck−1)
if p ≥ t then
s ← s+ size (c2 . . . ck−1c, l − 1, t · p)
return s
funtion total_size(t) ⊲ t: threshold
return
∑
i
size (⊥ . . .⊥, i, t · λ(i))
when a k-graph does not appear in the training set
due to under-sampling, then the probability of a
password ontaining that k-graph is omputed as
0. Suh a model would therefore never generate
the required password.
5.1.2 Computing The Searh Spae Size
So far, we have desribed a model that assigns prob-
abilities to passwords, with the aim of measuring
how likely it is that a user would atually selet a
given password. A rational attaker would use this
model by enumerating andidate passwords start-
ing with the most likely ones and ontinuing in de-
reasing order of probability.
In order to measure the searh spae size that
suh a strategy would need to explore before nding
a given password, we have to nd out how many
unsuessful andidates would be generated before
the orret one: if the Markovian model labels the
probability of a password as p, its assoiated searh
spae size would therefore be the number of strings
with probability of ourrene higher than or equal
to p.
Expliit Counting The most obvious system
for omputing the searh spae size up to a given
threshold is to plainly enumerate it. In Algorithm
1, we show how this an be implemented with a
simple reursive algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 Approximation of searh spae size.
funtion appr_size(c1 . . . ck−1, l, t)
⊲ c1 . . . ck−1: state, l: string length, t:
log-threshold
if l = 0 then return 1
s← 0
for all c ∈ C do
t ← t−⌈− logb ν (c1 . . . ck−1c| c1 . . . ck−1)⌉
if t ≥ 0 then
s ← s +
ahe_size
(
c2 . . . ck−1c, l − 1, t
)
return s
funtion ahe_size(c1 . . . ck−1, l, t)
⊲ We store results from approx_size in a
ahe K
if (c1 . . . ck−1, l, t) /∈ K then
K (c1 . . . ck−1, l, t) ←
appr_size (c1 . . . ck−1, l, t)
return K (c1 . . . ck−1, l, t)
funtion total_size(t) ⊲ t: threshold
return
∑
i
ahe_size (⊥ . . .⊥, i, ⌊− logb t · λ(i)⌋)
Approximate Estimation As the searh spae
grows, the above approah beomes extremely ex-
pensive and should be replaed with an approx-
imate estimation method [11℄. By xing a base
b > 1, any probability p an be approximate as b−l
for an integer value l ≥ 0. Choosing l = ⌊− logb p⌋
approximates p by exess, while l = ⌈− logb p⌉ ap-
proximates by defet. To help intuition, l an be
seen as a disrete password strength value, whih
an be omputed as the sum of strengths for eah k-
graph ontained in the password. Values of b loser
to 1 result in a ner granularity for our approxima-
tion, at the ost of an inrease in omputation.
By adopting suh an alteration, the omputation
gets a big speedup by memoizing the parameters
and results of eah approx_size all, and return-
ing them when the funtion is alled again with the
same parameters. This ouldn't be done with the
former version, sine the t threshold parameter of
the size funtion is a oating point number whih
is very likely to be dierent at eah funtion all.
Sine we are aiming for a onservative estimate
for the searh spae that approximates by exess
the apabilities of the attaker, we use approxima-
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Figure 2: Searh spae size versus probability
threshold for the k-graph Markovian model. The
plotted urves show the result of the exat om-
putation of Algorithm 1, while the points marked
by rosses are the result of the approximation of
Algorithm 2.
tions to obtain a lower limit for the searh spae
size. To do this, we approximate the starting
threshold by defet and all the ν probabilities by
exess.
The result of these modiations is the approxi-
mate funtion dened in Algorithm 2.
5.2 Experimental results
This setion desribes the results of the experi-
ments desribed above when applied to our pass-
word dataset. Unless otherwise speied, we use
the passwords themselves as training set.
Searh Spae Size Versus Probability
Threshold In Figure 2 we show the size of
searh spae ontaining strings labeled with a
probability greater or equal to a given probability
threshold. This is omputed for dierent values
of k and using both the exat ount and the
approximate measure from Algorithm 2. We
used a parameter b = 1.01; with that hoie, we
obtained a relative error of the order of 5% (not
notieable in the gure due to the log-log sale).
By hoosing 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 (i.e., basing the model
on sub-strings of lengths 1 to 3), the probabilities
of strings generated by the model roughly follow a
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Figure 3: Searh spae size versus fration of
guessed passwords.
power law. It is interesting to note that this mirrors
frequenies of words in human natural languages,
whih obey the power law as well [22℄. For k ≥ 4,
the number of andidate strings grows denitely
slower as the probability threshold inreases; this
is due to the fat that eah k-graph is represented
by a low number of strings in the training set, and
the number of strings that an be obtained by om-
bining k-graphs that are present in the dataset is
limited. We onjeture that, with a bigger training
set, we would obtain a power-law distribution also
in this ase.
In the following, we use the approximate ap-
proah to estimate the searh spae size where the
exat value beomes either impratial or impossi-
ble to ompute. We ompute data points for eah
p = 10−i threshold (i being an integer) and inter-
polate with the power law that onnets the points
(a straight line in the log-log plot).
Password Strength In Figure 3, we plot the
fration of passwords guessed as a funtion of the
searh spae size.
With higher values of k, we obtain better results
for the weaker passwords due to the more preise
modeling obtained in this ase. However, the pass-
words that inlude k-graphs not represented in the
training set annot be guessed. Methods based on
smaller k values beome more eetive beause they
an generalize some more. In pratie, the opti-
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Figure 4: Searh spae size versus fration of
guessed passwords on the MySpae dataset.
mal strategy depends on the resoures of the at-
taker, measured by the number of attempts that
an be tried.
The diminishing returns eet that we disov-
ered for ditionary attaks also applies to this teh-
nique: even when hoosing the best value of k
for eah ase, around 100,000 andidates need to
be tried in order to guess 20% of the passwords
(k = 5); this number rises to roughly 1.1 billions
andidates for a suess rate of 40% (k = 3); the
searh spae needed to break 90% of the passwords
grows to approximately 3 · 1017 (k = 2). With suh
a huge variane in the size of the searh spae, it
seems that no reasonable attak based on password
guessing would sueed in guessing all passwords
 exepting those ases where users are artiially
fored to limit password strength, for example by
imposing a maximum length.
MySpae Passwords In Figure 4, we repeat
our measurements using MySpae passwords in the
plae of our main dataset both as training set and
as guessed passwords. We obtain qualitatively sim-
ilar results  in partiular, higher values of k are
more appropriate as training sets for weaker pass-
words, and the diminishing returns priniple holds.
From a quantitative point of view, the searh spae
for weak password is bigger, while it is smaller for
stronger passwords. We think that this is mainly
due to the partiularities of the dataset: weak pass-
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Figure 5: Comparison of brute fore and Markov-
model based attaks.
words are made stronger by the requirement of non-
alphabeti haraters; strong passwords reated by
seurity-onsious users, on the other hand, are
under-represented sine suh users are not likely to
fall vitim to a phishing attak.
Brute Fore In Figure 5, we ompare the brute
fore approah with our Markovian modeling. The
brute fore approah starts by trying the empty
password, then proeeds with enumerating all pos-
sible passwords with inreasing length. The full
Uniode harater set urrently has more than
99,000 haraters
5
, but many of them are very rare
and denitely unlikely in a password; to aount for
this, we again took a onservative approah over-
estimating the attaker apabilities, and took into
aount only the 124 haraters that we have found
in our dataset.
In all but the most extreme ases, the Markovian
model proves more eient by orders of magnitude.
It is not before 1040 andidates (and having found
99.7% of the passwords) that a brute fore approah
beomes more eetive than the Markovian model
with k = 1 (harater frequenies). This num-
ber is well beyond the apabilities of any realis-
ti attaker: to put this in ontext, a luster of a
thousand 10 GHz mahines would need more than
3 · 1019 years to reah that number of iterations,
even assuming that they are able to try a password
5
http://www.uniode.org/press/pr-ud5.0.html
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Figure 6: Satter plots of password length (Y axis)
versus strength (assoiated searh spae size on X
axis).
for eah lok yle.
Strength and Password Length In Figure 6,
we highlight the relationship between a password
length and its strength. As the graphs show, the
assumption that longer passwords are stronger an
only be regarded as a rule of thumb: a short pass-
word ontaining infrequent haraters and/or se-
quenes thereof an be atually stronger than a no-
tieably longer one. The orrelation between length
and strength beomes weaker as the k parameter
grows: long but weak passwords may be based on
preditable long patterns that are less eiently
predited by models based on lower k values. For
example, it is quite likely that the abd sequene
is followed by a e; a model based on digraphs,
though, annot apture this and an only model
whih harater is more likely to follow a d.
Training Sets Figure 7 illustrates how the hoie
of training sets aets the attak performane. The
training sets used are our sets of usernames and
passwords, the MySpae leaked passwords, the JtR
ommon password ditionary, and Italian and En-
glish ditionaries.
The most eetive training set is the real pass-
word set. The ommon passwords ditionary
from JtR is more representative of real passwords
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Figure 7: Comparison of various training sets for
guessing passwords in our dataset (k = 2).
than standard ditionaries, sine it ontains om-
binations of haraters, suh as puntuation and
digits, that don't appear in standard ditionaries.
Still, it appears that average passwords do not
losely resemble the most ommon ones.
The ase of MySpae passwords as training set is
interesting: they are lose to the performane of our
password dataset for strong passwords, but they do
not represent weak ones well. We believe this is due
to the over-representation of non-alphabeti har-
aters, whih are required to be present in MySpae
passwords. The dierene in overage on strong
passwords (around 5% with equivalent searh spae
size) an also be attributed to this feature, as well
as to the following fators:
• Dierene in omputer literay: the MySpae
sample ontains only the vitims of a phishing
attak;
• Dierene in language: MySpae users are dis-
tributed worldwide.
If a representative training set of real passwords
is not available to the attaker, usernames are by
far the most eetive training set. It appears that,
when users are asked to provide a username and
a password, they employ similar riteria. This is
quite surprising sine the two strings need to sat-
isfy very dierent, and arguably oniting, rite-
ria: good usernames are easily memorable, while a
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Figure 8: Comparison of omplexity between pass-
words and usernames.
strong password has to be as diult to guess as
possible.
Usernames The former result suggests a onsid-
eration: usernames and passwords are hosen si-
multaneously, when registering a new aount. A
user wants both strings to be memorable, sine the
two are needed in order to log on suessfully. How-
ever, while there is no inentive in hoosing omplex
usernames, a seurity onsious user will ommit
some eort to make his password more omplex.
The dierene in omplexity between usernames
and passwords is therefore a way to measure the
eort that users willingly put in making their pass-
words more omplex: while usernames an be very
long or diult to guess, this is not likely to happen
as the result of a onsious attempt to do so.
In Figure 8, we ompare the searh spae size
assoiated to usernames and passwords. Mathing
what we have done with passwords, the training
set used to guess a given username onsists of all
the usernames exept the one under srutiny. It
turns out that the eort that users put in reating
omplex passwords is measurable, but it is overall
quite weak: given a hoie for k and a searh spae
size, the perentage of raked usernames never
exeeds the raked passwords by more than 15%.
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6 Combined Strategy
Our results onrm that no single strategy or teh-
nique is more eetive in reduing the searh spae:
ditionaries are most eetive in disovering the
weakest passwords; the overage (fration of pass-
words that are in the ditionary) grows as the di-
tionary size grows, but this entails a loss in prei-
sion (fration of ditionary items that are atual
passwords). The Markov-hain based tehnique
should be used when ditionaries are exhausted.
Higher values of k obtain better results at rst, but
after a number of attempts they beome quite in-
eetive.
No single strategy is the best one for all ases;
this, in fat, validates the approah taken by pass-
word reovery systems that adopt bigger and big-
ger ditionaries in asade, and resort afterwards to
Markov-based tehniques. In this setion, we sum-
marize our results by presenting the results that an
attaker would be able to obtain by using suh a
tehnique.
Consistently with our approah of estimating the
apabilities of the attaker by exess in the fae of
unertainty, we assume that the attaker has aess
to a password training set whih is as eetive as
the one we obtain from the lear text. Furthermore,
we also assume that the attaker is able to predit
the eetiveness of tehniques that we measured in
Setions 4 and 5.
Based on this knowledge, using the training set as
a ditionary, the strategy for the ditionary-based
rst part of the attak is as follows:
1. Try the username;
2. Try the ommon passwords ditionary;
3. Try all passwords in the training set;
4. Try the English 1 ditionary;
5. Try the Italian 1 and 2 ditionaries;
6. Try the English 2, 3 and extra ditionaries;
7. Try all remaining JtR ditionaries;
8. Try mangling rules.
If this approah is not suient, one should resort
to the Markovian model.
Figure 9: Searh spae size for passwords that are
not found in any ditionary. In the inner frame,
detail on the rst iterations.
In Figure 9, we show the searh spae for the
passwords that have not been disovered within
any ditionary. With respet to gure 3, there is a
sharp derease in the suess rate until the searh
spae size reahes approximately 108. In partiular,
tehniques with k = 5 and k = 4 are unsuessful
to break more than, respetively, roughly 1% and
4% of the passwords. This mathes with the intu-
ition that ditionary-based attaks are more useful
against the less omplex passwords.
Based on the data represented in Figure 9, an
eient strategy for the attak would be as follows:
1. Try 500,000 andidates with the model based
on k = 5;
2. Try 7,000,000 andidates with k = 4;
3. Try 700,000,000 andidates with k = 3;
4. Try 7 · 1016 andidates with k = 2 ;
5. Continue with k = 1.
In Table 4, we summarize the searh spae size
and perentage of raked passwords for eah of
these steps. This is the answer to our original ques-
tion: how many attempts an attaker would need in
order to guess a given perentage of the passwords.
By integrating this with system-spei knowledge
suh as the omputational ost needed to perform
a single guess and the amount of resoures that the
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Step #attempts Craked
Username 1 2.88%
Common passwords 3,115 9.95%
Training set 10,431 28.83%
English 1 36,574 30.51%
Italian 1 98,511 32.25%
Italian 2 373,834 36.31%
English 2 632,613 37.18%
English 3 722,215 37.69%
English extra 1,123,841 40.07%
JtR - all ditionaries 3,923,660 41.14%
Mangling 40,538,747 44.26%
Markov hain - k = 5 41,070,093 45.05%
Markov hain - k = 4 48,051,199 46.76%
Markov hain - k = 3 ~750,000,000 58.10%
Markov hain - k = 2 ~7 · 1016 91.06%
Markov hain - k = 1 ~1040 99.71%
Table 4: Cumulative number of attempts and of
guessed passwords for the multi-step approah.
Candidates that would be heked in more than one
ditionary are ounted only one. For the Markov
hain tehnique with k ≤ 3, the searh spae has
not been generated expliitly and its size has been
approximated with Algorithm 2.
attaker has aess to, it is possible to estimate the
perentage of passwords that are vulnerable to a
given attak.
7 Conlusion
As the bibliography of this work witnesses, the rst
studies on password raking date bak to almost
30 years ago. Still, the tehniques that are used in
state of the art password-raking appliations are
quite simple: deades of researh suggest that it is
possible to do better than applying simple Markov
hain-based modeling tehniques.
The results of our measurement study may pro-
vide an explanation as to why not muh has been
done in this diretion: the diminishing returns ef-
fet implies that, even if the size of the searh spae
dereases by orders of magnitude, the perentage of
passwords that an attaker would be able to rak
in a given number of attempt would inrease only
by a non-impressive perentage. In addition, it is
likely that an innovative strategy for exploring the
searh spae would improve over the state of the
art only for a given interval of searh spae sizes;
the low-ost/high-reward part of the searh spae
is already easily overed by ditionaries of frequent
passwords. When suh an attak proves ineetive,
an attaker ould hange target to nd an easier
prey, or use other means of attak whih are not
based on the password strength, suh as soial en-
gineering, phishing, or exploitation of vulnerabili-
ties in software or in the protool: as the energies
instilled into an unsuessful attak grow, the at-
tak is more and more likely to be unsuessful in
the future as well.
We foused on the strength of passwords hosen
by users in the absene of password strength en-
forement. As pointed out in Setion 2, it is debat-
able that systems enforing password omplexity
atually inrease seurity: they may instead lead
users to irumvent the enforement tehniques by
adopting inseure behavior. To assess this, measur-
ing password omplexity with and without enfore-
ment should be oupled with an analysis of user
behavior.
Another interesting question yet to be addressed
regards the orrelation between password strength
and the domain they are related to. In partiu-
lar, how will the password strength of a user vary
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if getting an aount ompromised would result in
a notieable loss? In [4℄, some evidene that users
atually hoose better passwords for aounts re-
lated to valuable assets (e.g., PayPal) is reported.
Unfortunately, the bit-strength measure adopted is
quite simple. Further investigations would be re-
quired to obtain atual gures in terms of attaker
osts in order to break an aount.
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